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In 1971 the government of Chile under President
Salvador Allende nationalized the partly Ameri-
can-owned copper companies that made up the
so-called Large Copper Mining sector (Gran
Mineria del Cobre), namely those exploiting
mines with a production capacity of at least
75,000 metric tons a year.'
The nationalization gave rise to a sharp conflict
between Chile and the American companies which
resulted in legal and commercial reprisals being
undertaken by the companies both in the United
States and in Western Europe, and was by all
accounts an important factor in determining the
policy of economic isolation of Allende pursued
by the American government and by international
organizations with strong American influence.
That conflict is now ended following the comple-
tion of compensation agreements between the
American companies and the present Chilean
military regime according to which the firms
involved stand to receive far more than under the
terms of the 1971 nationalization, the orders of
magnitude being, in fact, comparable to those
discussed with the companies ten years before.
This article will attempt to describe and tenta-
tively evaluate the agreements, placing them in
the context of those previous instances in which
issues regarding payment for nationalized
property were raised between the Chilean govern-
ment and the American companies, and suggesting
factors that may account for the high repayment
terms agreed upon.
The Frei agreements: valuation and compensation
The question of the compensation for the acquisi-
tion of American copper interests in Chile arose
for the first time as a major political issue in
connection with the partial nationalizations
effected by the government of the Christian
Democratic President, Eduardo Frei (1964-70).
I The companies included were those operating the mines of
Chuquicamata and Salvador, in which The AnacondaCompany was a 49 per cent shareholder; El Teniente, with
a 49 per cent equity belonging to Kennecott Copper Cor-
poration; and Exotica, with a 75 per c2nt Anaconda interest.
Also nationalized was the Andina company, in which Cerro
Corporation had a 70 per cent interest and which was
contemplating expanding above the 75,000 metric tons mark
within the next few years. Together the five mines accounted
in 1970 for 78 per cent of the total copper production in
Chile and for 59 per cent of the total value of Chilean
exports.
In 1967 the Chilean government purchased 51 per
cent of Kennecott's interest in the Teniente
company, as part of a global agreement that
included a significant tax reduction for the new
joint venture and an expansion programme cost-
ing approximately $230 million. The price offered
for the 51 per cent equity was $80 million, which
was $13 million more than the total book value
of Teniente. Kennecott had argued that the book
value under-estimated the real worth of the fixed
assets of the company, and requested an outside
appraisal to determine their current value. The
Chilean government agreed and an appraisal
carried out by a US firm produced a figure of
over $244 million, raising the total book value to
$286 million. As it was politically difficult for the
government to pay more than $100 million,
further tax concessions were offered to persuade
Kennecott to accept that only $160 million be
entered as capital, the rest being imputed as
reserves.2
The sum of $80 million was paid by Chile in cash
between 1967 and 1970. However, an additional
agreement established that Kennecott would lend
back to the new joint venture the instalments paid
by the Chilean government, plus interest, to
contribute to the expansion plan. This loan
amounted to $92 million and was repayable over
a period of 15 years starting in 1971 with an
annual interest of 5+ per cent per year. As far as
Kennecott was concerned, this was in fact the
payment for the 51 per cent interest acquired by
Chile; Chile, however, had had effectively to
transfer that amount from its own resources to
the new company in the preceding four years.
Other features of the agreement included a
reductiôn in Kennecott's tax burden as minority
shareholder from over 80 per cent to 44 per cent
of gross profits, a level that was furthermore
guaranteed by the government for a period of
20 years. Additional contracts gave Kennecott the
2 This valuation has been the subject of considerable con-
troversy. The point has been made that if the book value was
less than the real worth of the assets, this could only be
due to accelerated depreciation or to imputing to operational
costs expenditures that were really of a capital flaturC. In
both cases there is avoidance of taxes by means of artifi-
cially inflating costs. In the first case taxes are postponed,
and hence the procedure amounts to an interest-free loan
of the government to the company; in the second case
capitalization taxes are avoided altogether. See K. Griffin,
Underdevelepment in Spanish America, (George Allen and
Unwin, London), 1969, p. 154. E. Novoa. La batalla por
el cobre (Editorial Quimantu, Santiago), 1972, provides a
general description and critique of the Frei agreements.
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management of the mine and control over the
sales of copper and the purchase of inputs for
periods of between 10 and 20 years.
Taken as a whole, the terms of the agreement
with Kennecott offered quite generous compensa-
tion for the transfer of ownership of 51 per cent
of its interest in Chilean copper. In the end
KennecQtt had written off its books assets for
$34 million (51 per cent of the 1966 book value)
but had added a credit for $80 million and
retained a 49 per cent interest in a company
which was now worth $286 million. At the same
time it had secured for its Chilean subsidiary a
twenty year tax regime that cut its tax liabilities
in half, and had retained control over the
operation of the company for a similar period.
The reason for this generosity on the Chilean side
is probably two-fold: on the one hand, the Frei
government badly needed to be able to show a
concrete result of its much emphasized copper
policy, particularly in the face of hostility both
from the parties of the left, that were pressin.g for
complete nationalization, and from right-wing
sectors, that were strongly against Frei's other
main policy, the agrarian reform programme; on
the other hand, the world copper price level and
its future prospects appeared good. In fact, the
actual level of prices far exceeded the expectations
of the government negotiators, and as a result
Kennecott enjoyed extraordinarily high profits in
1967-69. The same was the case with Anaconda,
which in 1967 had refused to accept joint owner-
ship with Chile and had offered instead, in ex-
change for tax reductions, an investment pro-
gramme of about $126 million to be financed
from its own resources.3
lt was precisely the political furore prompted by
the windfall profits of the companies that forced
the government in ¡969 to introduce changes in
the companies' regime. This time it was. agreed
that Anaconda would sell to Chile 100 per cent
of its interest in Chuquicamata and Salvador.
This would b done in two stages. In the first,
following the Kermecott model, joint ventures
were constituted and Chile bought 51 per cent of
the shares. The price paid was based on the book
value of Anaconda's subsidiaries at the end of
1969. Promissory noies were issued by Chile in
3 The last element of the 1967 agreements was the establish-
ment of a joint venture with Cerro Corporation for the
exploitation of the Río Blanco mine. The new company
called Compañía Minera Andhia was 70 pr cent owned by
Cerro (30 per cent by the Chilean State) and an initiai
investment of ¶89 million was agreed, to b financed with
external credits.
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the amount of about $175 million corresponding
to 24 six-monthly instalments beginning June
1970 with an annual interest of six per cent.
Anaconda retained the management of the new
companies and the sales of copper and procuring
of inputs for a period of eight years, and was to
be paid for these services a fee of one per cent of
the total value of sales per year.
As for the remaining 49 per cent of the shares
Chile undertook to purchase them by 1982, at a
price based on the annual average profit of
Anaconda as minority shareholder from January
1970 to the time of the purchase, multiplied by a
factor of eight.4 It was also agreed that a pref er-
ential dividend be established in favour of Chile
on the profits of the joint ventures whenever the
price of copper rose above 40 US cents per
pound. This agreement was conditional upon
Kennecott accepting a similar arrangement, which
it eventually did.
In some respects the agreement with Anaconda
in 1969 was more favourable to Chile than the
agreement with Kennecott in 1967, and no doubt
this is at least partially due to a political climate
generally hostile to the companies mentioned
above. Thus book value was used to determine
the price of the 51 per cent; the preferential
dividend in favour of Chile was established from
the outset; and no down payment was contem-
plated. In other respects, the two were quite
similar: again control over management, sales
and purchases remained in the hands of the
American company. In fact, here Anaconda fared
better than Kennecott, as it was to be paid a
handsome fee for the services.
In one main respect, the Anaconda agreement
was more favourable to the company than the
Kerinecott one, particularly considering Anacon-
da's corporate policy of rejecting partial divesti-
ture as a more or less permanent solution, and
that is in the price to be paid for the 49 per cent
of the equity. Even though Anaconda did not
challenge book value as a true reflection of the
worth of the assets, the system agreed upon
could have easily yielded figures more than twice
as high as book value, depending on the price of
copper and the time of the purchase.
The 1971 nationalization: compensation and
excess profits
Salvador Allende took office on 4 November,
1970; the bill proposing the nationalization of the
4 If the purchase were to be made in 1974; beginning 1974,
the factor would decrease by 0.5 yearly until 1977 and
remain constant thereafter.
copper companies, in the form of an amendment
to the Chilean constitution, was submitted to
Congress on 21 December that year. After seven
months of debate, the nationalization bill was
passed unanimously by Congress, including
members of all Chilean political parties. It
nationalized the companies of Gran Minería and
Andina as whole legal and economic entities, that
is, including both assets and liabilities, and
provided that they had a right to compensation at
book value as of 31 December, 1970, less:
any revaluations done by the companies after
31 December, 1964. This applies specifically to
the Teniente revaluation of 1967;
the value of rights to mining deposits that
may appear in the books of the companies,
since according to Chilean law mining deposits
are the property of the State; and
the value of assets that the State receives in
defective operational condition or without
service rights, repairs and spare parts.
In addition, the amendment also established that
the President of Chile could order a deduction of
all or part of the excess profits received by the
companies since 1955 (i.e. the year in which the
American subsidiaries were compelled by law to
keep accounts in Chile). A judicial procedure was
established to determine the final amount of
compensation, and the President was empowered
to decide on the form, period and interest of
payment of the compensation, which should be
in cash within 30 years and with an interest of no
less than three per cent per annum. The com-
pensation thus arrived at superseded any previous
agreements for the purchase of shares.
In order to establish the criteria for normal
profitability, a number of studies were carried
out by Chilean technical agencies, the basic one
being the comparison between the profitability of
the American companies in their world operation
and in their Chilean operation as a percentage of
the respective book values. The summary results
are as follows:
table I
Anaconda and Kennecott: annual average profits
as percentage of book value, 1955-70
world exc!.
world Chile Chile
* Chuquicamata
Source: P. Nudelman. La compensación a las
compañías del cobre nacionalizadas por el
Gobierno de Chile Santiago, mimeograph, 1973.
The President finally decided to consider as
normal a profit of 12 per cent on book value and
ordered a deduction of all profits exceeding that
percentage.
The final calculations of compensation done by
the Comptroller General of Chile are as follows:
table 2
Chile, 1971: calculation of compensation to the
nationalized copper companies
($ million)
Chu qui- Salva- Exo- Ten-
camata dor tioa iente Andina
book value 242 68 15 319 20
deductions for:
mining rights
and defective
assets 18 6 5 21 2
revaluation O 0 0 198 0
compensation 224 62 lO lOO 18
deduction for
excessprofits 300 64 0 410 0
Source: Comptroller General's Resolution on
Compensation, 11 October 1972. Figures have
been rounded to the nearest million dollars.
As suggested before, the decision on excess profits
precipitated a conflict with the American com-
panies. Chile did not honour the promissory notes
held by Anaconda for the 51 per cent equity that
fell due on 31 December 1971. In February 1972
Anaconda obtained in New York an order of
attachment of goods, assets and bank accounts
belonging to the Copper Corporation of Chile
and the Chilean Development Corporation, to
cover the value of the notes. Attempts by Chile
to have the attachment vacated were unsuccessful
and as a result Chile started experiencing diffi-
culties in procuring spare parts for the mines, as
95 per cent of the imported inputs were of
American origin and many could not be obtained
elsewhere. It would also appear that Anaconda
exercised influence on the main suppliers of the
Chilean mines to induce them to stop selling to
Chile, or to harden their commercial terms.
Kennecott, for its part, first tried to obtain a
judicial review in Chile of the excess profits
decision. When this failed in September 1972, the
company launched a legal offensive in Europe,
which was initially successful in attaching
Teniente copper or the proceeds of its sale in
France, Holland and Germany. Although by early
1973 all attachments had been vacated, the
ordinary proceedings to determine the ownership
of the copper continued through that year, and
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Anaconda 7.2 3.5 20.2*
Kennecott 11.6 10.0 34.8
similar proceedings were instituted in Italy and
Sweden. Kennecott also put pressure on European
firms to get them to stop buying Teniente copper.
The basic legal argument of Anaconda and
Kennecott was that the nationalization was null
and void according to international law and the
legal system of the European countries involved
because it was not followed by compensation. In
fact some compensation was being paid. Kenne-
cott continued to receive payment from Chile for
the $92 million loan, which, as suggested, was
really the payment for the 51 per cent purchased
by Frei. This sum was about $8 million less than
the total book value of Teniente in 1971 exclud-
ing the revaluation. Anaconda had not been so
fortunate, having received about $36 million
corresponding to the first three instalments for
the 51 per cent of Chuquicamata and Salvador
plus interest. In both cases the fact that Chile
accepted responsibility for the outstanding debt
of the nationalized companies meant that there
was indirect compensation for the amount of the
debt. In the case of Teniente, the liabilities as of
December 1971 amounted to about 75 per cent
of the gross value of assets excluding the revalua-
tion, and about 45 per cent of that value including
the revaluation. In the case of Chuquicamata and
Salvador the corresponding figure is about 43 per
cent. Compensation was also to be paid to
Anaconda for Exotica, and to Cerro for Andina
at levels very close to their book value, since those
companies only started operation in 1970 and
therefore there were no excess profits to be
deducted. (See table 2)
This preceding argument was, of course, unaccept-
able to the companies. Kennecott stated that a
satisfactory settlemeñt would at a minimum
entail payment of the revalued book value of the
49 per cent, i.e. about $176 million Anaconda on
the one side started the legal fight for payment of
the outstanding promissory notes for the 51 per
cent purchaseamounting in all to $153 million
and on the other took a write-off for tax
purposes in the US for $303 million plus a claim
for $159 million against the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), a US federal
agency that insures American investment against
political risk in underdeveloped countries. The
total of its chrimed losses was $474 million includ-
ing $12 million corresponding to Exotica which
were later paid by OPIC.5
5 For Kennecott, see Kennecott Copper Corporation Expro-
priation of El Teniente, New York, 1971; for Anaconda,
The Wall Street Journal, 25 July 1974.
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The one American company with which there
was no open conflict following nationalization
was Cerro, whose subsidiary Andina was awarded
a compensation of $19 million, of which Cerro
was entitled to slightly over $13 million The
Allende government announced it was prepared
to pay this amount in 29 six-monthly instalments
beginning 31 December 1973, with a net interest
of seven per cent. This settlement was termed
'reasonable' by the company which further
announced its intention to continue working with
the Chilean government in the operation and
development of the Rio Blanco mine. In addition,
Chile recognized a debt to Cerro for an $18 million
loan to Andina and offered to pay in the same
terms as the compensation.
The conflict with the companies became a major
element in the international position of the
Allende government. Even though the legal
offensive of the companies had limited success in
disrupting the operation of the mines or the sales
of Chilean copper on the world market, the
compensation issue was an important factor in
determining the interruption of grants and credits
to Chile from the American government, and in
particular the Export-Import Bank, that provided
financing and guarantees for the bulk of Chilean
imports from the United States.6 American
pressure was also a main factor in stopping the
flow of credits from the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, that lent Allende a total of $11.6
million in three years while the yearly average of
loans in 1965-69 had been $40 million; and from
the World Bank, which did not extend any credit
to the Allende government.7 The American
government further refused to renegotiate the
Chilean debt. The effect of this blockade of
credits was to add considerably to the foreign
exchange difficulties that Allende had to face,
particularly in 1972 and early 1973 when low
copper prices and an increase in the import of
agricultural products combined to put enormous
pressure on the country's balance of payments.
6 Following the recent revelations about CIA interference in
Chilean politics with the purpose of 'destabilizing' the Allende
government, there have been unchallenged reports in the
US press to the effect that the American government exercised
systematic pressure on private banks to stop credit to Chile.
In fact, the short-term lines of credit to Chile of the American
private banking system decreased from about $220 million
in 1970 to about $30 million in 1971. The timing of these
moves by the American government would suggest, however,
that they were only partially caused by the copper issue,
and that there was a more general rejection of the Allende
government, which not even a settlement with the companies
would have removed. See The New York Times, 15
September 1974.
7 J. Collins, "Tighttning the Financial Knot", IDOC, no. 58,
December 1973, pp. 70-74; P. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible
Blockade' and the Overthow of Allende", Foreign Affairs,
vol. 52 no. 2, January 1974, pp. 322-340, accepts the point
with respect to 1DB while arguing generally that there was
no 'invisible blockade'.
In view of this situation, the Allende government
requested from the American government the
application of the Treaty for the Peaceful Settle-
ment of Disputes signed by the two countries in
1914 and the suspension of the economic
sanctions, while the Investigating Commission
called for by the Treaty issued a report. The
United States government refused on the grounds
that the Investigating Commission's report was
not binding but only a recommendation, and
pressed for a concrete settlement of the com-
pensation question on bases different from those
of the Chilean constitutional amendment that
nationalized copper. A major concern of the
American side in this connection was the need to
remove the precedent of the retroactive deduc-
tion of excess profits, lest American interests all
over the world could be endangered. This was not
acceptable to Chile and so the impasse continued
until the military coup that deposed the Allende
government in September 1973.
The military regime and the American companies
Shortly after the coup the new military rulers of
Chile announced their intention to settle the
compensation issue with the American companies.
This was, of course, far from surprising consider-
ing that the economic policies of the new regime
call for a substantial influx of direct foreign
investment. Negotiations were started at the end
of 1973 and by October 1974 agreement had
been reached with respect to all operations except
Exotica, and all legal actions of the companies
had been discontinued.
The agreement with Cerro was signed in March
1974.8 The total amount to be paid is $41.8
million, including the $13.2 million that the
Allende government was prepared to pay for
compensation, the $18 million loan also recog-
nized by Allende and a sum of $10.6 million for
what the published reports term 'unspecified
commitments'. Payment is to be made with $3.2
million in cash and a 17-year note bearing
interest of 9.2 per cent net a year. The compensa-
tion offered is, then, $10 million more than what
the Allende government would have paid; the
time period is two years longer but the interest is
considerably higher. Furthermore, the agreement
includes the possibility of much faster repayment
through the sale to Cerro of concentrates and
slags from the Rio Blanco mine whose proceeds
would amortize the debt. Although Rio Blanco's
production of about 55,000 tons of concentrates
a year is mostly tied up in long-term contracts,
there still remains a sufficiently large uncom-
mitted tonnage to make it possible to effect
repayment in a period of considerably less than
17 years. Lastly, in December the Chilean Copper
Corporation announced that it had appointed
Cerro as the sole agent for the sale of Chilean
copper in the US and Canada, a development
that in all likelihood is not unconnected with the
compensation agreement, as an agency contract
of this kind has a definite value for the American
company.
The second agreement was with Anaconda, with
which a Settlement Contract was signed in July
1974. Although the complete text has not been
made public, the Decree-Law approving the
Contract and the public announcement by the
Minister of Mines of the Chilean junta9 disclosed
the following features:
(j) the basis for compensation is the book value
of the companies as of 31 December 1970,
less certain unspecified deductions. It seems
clear that there were no deductions for excess
profits.
Chile will pay for the remainder of the
51 per cent purchased in 1969 the sum of
$194 million of which $6 million will be paid
in cash and the rest by means of 19 equal
promissory notes due every six-months start-
ing 1 February 1975 with a net interest of
six per cent per annum.
Anaconda is to receive a cash payment of
$44.4 million and $15 million respectively
for the 49 per cent of the shares of Chuqui-
camata and Salvador. The Chilean announce-
ment states that this figure takes into account
the time elapsed between 31 December 1970
and 30 June 1974, and that deduction has
been made of taxes owed by the Anaconda
subsidiaries in the amount of $34.7 million.
The amount granted to Anaconda, then, is com-
posed of the $253.4 million of the settlement, plus
$21.8 million paid on the 51 per cent of the shares
in 1970/71,10 plus $34.7 million of taxes that were
offset against the compensation figure, for a total
of $310 million. This is $24 million more than the
Comptroller General's assessment of the book
value of the two companies in December 1970
without any deduction for excess profits. The
$24 million figure is approximately equal to the
interest on the amount outstanding of the 51 per
cent for the period June 1971-June 1974. The
Chilean announcement maintains that the agree-
9 El Mercurio, Santiago, 25 July 1974.8 Latin America Economic Report, London, 12 April 1974,
10 Including interest, the actual amount paid was $36 million.p. 59.
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ment is advantageous for Chile since Anaconda
was in addition entitled to damages of about
$24.5 million for the non-payment of the promis-
sory notes due between December 1971 and June
1974. This estimate, however, seems to calculate
damages at the rather extraordinary rate of 12 per
cent compound interest every six months, i.e. four
times the original rate of interest on the debt.
Furthermore, it could be argued that the cash
paymentwhich is really composed of the $65
million plus the setoff for $34.7 millioncan be
considered to be a higher present value than the
same amount spread over ten years at six per cent
per annum. The discount rate for Anaconda is
probably quite high, due to the abnormal political
situation in Chile and the fact that the immediate
reaction of the Chilean opposition in exile was to
state that the agreements violated the Constitution
and were not to be recognized by any government
that would succeed the military. All in all, the
agreement seems to compensate fully the Ameri-
can company for the nationalized assets, even
though it falls short of the figure announced by
Anaconda in 1972 as the value of write-off and
insurance claims. Anaconda has announced that
it will continue its legal action to obtain payment
from OPIC, but in the event it is successful it will
pay a percentage of the $253 million to the
agency."
Finally, the agreement with Kennecott was signed
in October 1974. According to the announcemtht
by the Chilean Minister of Mines,'2 Kennecott is
awarded a compensation equal to 49 per cent of
the book value of Teniente in December 1970,
less unspecified deductions that include $19.6
million for outstanding taxation. The net com-
pensation is then put at $44.8 million to which is
added a sum of $9.1 million corresponding to
six per cent interest per year for the period
January 1971-September 1974. Lastly, a sum of
$14 million is awarded corresponding to dividends
and interests thereon for the 49 per cent equity
up to 31 December 1970, of which $6.5 million
are paid in cash. The remainder, as well as the
main sum, is paid in 19 six-monthly instalments
starting 25 April 1975 with an annual net interest
of six per cent.
In all, Kennecott is awarded $68 million plus
$19.6 million of tax setoff. Added to the $80
million of the 51 per cent equity this amounts to
about $70 million more than the unrevalued book
value in 1970 less defective assets according to
11 "News from Anaconda", 24 July 1974.
12 El Mercurio, 25 October 1974. Partial English translation
in Metal Bulletin, no. 5936, 29 October 1974, p. 20.
2S
the Comptroller General's estimate. The sum is,
however, $130 million less than the revalued book
value as of December 1970 minus defective assets.
Again, the deduction for excess profits called for
by the constitution is eliminated.
Kennecott, then, seems to have agreed to a com-
pensation for the 49 per cent equity that is about
one-half of its stated claim of $176 million,
although it is close to twice what it would have
received according to the 1971 nationalization
bill even in the absence of deduction for excess
profits. In effect, it has dropped its claim to the
revalued book value as the fair assessment of the
worth of the assets.
That this was probably not an easy step is no
doubt shown by the fact that the Kennecott
agreement took a full three months more to
achieve than the Anaconda settlement. One can
only speculate as to the reasons for their evelitual
willingness and one that immediately springs to
mind is the possibility of US government pressure.
The American government's eagerness to help the
Chilean junta was apparent at an early stage. In
the two months following the coup, direct bilateral
assistance was given in the form of commodity
credit loans for $52 million. Eximbank reopened
its credit and guarantee programme for Chile and
the Inter-American Development Bank, clearly
reflecting a change in the American position, had
granted credits for $201 million as of April 1974.
For fiscal year 1975, the US government proposed
to Congress about $85 million of aid to Chile,
including $25 million in AID development loans
interrupted since 1967about $1 million in
grant assistance (compared with $330,000 in
1973), $37 million in 'food for peace' grants and
loansas against $2.5 million in 1973and some
$21.5 million in militiary aid, about twice as much
as in l973.' Furthermore, the Chilean military
were quick to do away with what was the most
politically dangerous element in the Allende
nationalization, namely the deduction for excess
profits. This in itself probably made the possibility
of an early settlement with the companies a
desirable objective in the view of the American
government.
Despite the reduction in Kennecott's original
claim, the settlements represent a quite onerous
13 The AID proposal to Congress is justified as follows:
"Given the willingness of Chilean authorities to co-operate
in the resolution of outstanding bilateral problems of debt
and compensation, the efforts underway to regularize Chile's
international financial obligations, and . the serious Chilean
stabilization effort, reactivation of the AID loan programme
is proposed for FY 1975". Quoted in Inter-American
Economic Affairs, vol. 28 no. 1, Summer 1974, p. 89.
burden on the Chilean balance of payments. For
1974 total payments amount to $74.7 million plus
about $11 million of the Kennecott debt of $92
million.
In 1975, payments of principal and interest to
Anaconda will total about $30 million14; the
corresponding figure for Kennecott will be about
$10 million'5; and for Cerro, assuming no
acceleration of the repayment, it will add to little
less than $6 million'6. If one allows for some
payment for Exotica, about which no agreement
has yet been announced, but which is a much less
cor,flictive issue, the annual payments beginning
in 1975 may amount to over $55 million.
The decision to assume this heavy financial obli-
gation was probably eased for the Chilean military
by the fact that the sum of the direct US govern-
ment aid given to them after September 1973 plus
the proposed amount of aid for fiscal year 1975
is approximately equal to the payments to the
companies for 1974-75; another factor was
probably the record levels reached by copper
prices in early 1974 and the general expectation
that they would stay at comparatively high levels
for the remainder of 1974 and 1975. As it
happened, however, the recession in the Western
economies caused a considerable drop in the level
of prices in the second half of 1974: the average
for July-December was £660 per ton as compared
to £1,100 per ton in January-June. Despite the
attempt by producers belonging to the Inter-
governmental Council of Copper Exporting
Countries (Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia) to raise
the price by cutting down sales by 10 per cent, all
indications seem now to be that the price in 1975
will not greatly exceed the levels of late 1974. On
the other hand, the US government has had
serious difficulties in getting Congressional
approval for the proposed aid to the militaryjunta, due to the concern about violation of
human rights in Chile. In December 1974 a
Senate-House Conference voted to suspend all
military aid to the Chilean dictatorship, and it
seemed very likely that the decision would be
confirmed when it reached the floor of both
Houses.
The cost of the compensation agreements, there-
fore, may well end up more burdensome to the
14 Two promissory flotes for $99 million each plus interest
for $56 million and $S.4 million.
15 Two promissory flotes for $3.2 million each plus interests
for $1.8 million and $1.75 million. One should, again, add
the $10 million of the old debt.
16 One payment on the principal for $2.3 million plus $3.5
million interest.
Chilean military regime than they first anticipated.
But then that seems to be the price they are pre-
pared to pay to placate the American multi-
nationals and, they hope, reopen the flow, of
direct foreign investment to the country.
POSTSCRIPT
On 5 December 1974 the Chilean junta and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the
United States agreed on the compensation to be
paid for the nationalization of the Exotica mine.
It amounts to $12 million payable over a period
of five years with a net interest of 6 per cent per
year. This completed the settlement of all out-
standing claims deriving from the nationalization
of Gran Mineria.
According to a report in the Financial Time of
6 March 1975 the junta has further announced
that it will allow international mining corpora-
tions to wholly own new copper mines producing
100,000 tons or more a year. This reverses a
policy announced in 1974 according to which the
Chilean State would maintain at least a 51 per
cent interest in new mines of this size to be
developed by foreign investors.
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